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Abstract 
As a global agreement on climate mitigation and absolute emissions reductions remains 
grid-locked, this paper assesses whether the prospects for international technology 
cooperation in low-carbon sectors can be improved. It analyses the case of international 
cooperation on electric vehicle technologies to elaborate on the trade-offs that cooperation 
such  as this inherently attempts to balance– national growth objectives of industrial and 
technology development versus the global goods benefit of reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. It focuses on bilateral German-Chinese programmes for electric vehicle 
development, as well as multilateral platforms on low-carbon technology cooperation 
related to electric vehicles. Based on insights from these cases studies, this paper 
ultimately provides policy recommendations to address gaps in international technology 
cooperation at a bilateral level for ongoing German-Chinese engagement on electric 
vehicles; and at a multilateral level with a focus on the emerging technology cooperation 
framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
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Preface  
Mitigating climate change by reducing carbon emissions is one of the biggest and most 
complex issues the world has ever faced. Technological innovation plays a major role in 
taking on this challenge. Old and new industrial powers alike are increasingly reforming 
their policy frameworks to encourage low-carbon investment and innovation. 
Evolutionary economics has demonstrated how initial choices of technologies and 
institutional arrangements preclude certain options at later stages; hence, innovations 
evolve in an incremental and cumulative way, resulting in context-specific technological 
pathways. Such path dependency implies that technologies and institutions do not 
progressively converge toward a unique best practice, as neoclassical equilibrium models 
might suggest. The historical and social embeddedness of such evolutionary processes 
instead results in a variety of very different technologies and institutions across countries. 
The starting assumption of our research was that low-carbon technologies depend to a 
high degree on politically negotiated policies, mainly due to the failure of markets to 
reflect environmental costs. The way national governments and industries deal with the 
low-carbon challenge varies greatly depending on levels of environmental ambition, 
technological preferences (such as different attitudes towards nuclear energy, shale gas, 
carbon capture and storage), the ways markets are structured, and the importance attached 
to expected co-benefits (such as green jobs or energy security). Consequently, low-carbon 
technologies are more likely to evolve along diverging pathways than other technologies 
whose development is more market-driven. 
To test this assumption we conducted the international research project “Technological 
trajectories for low-carbon innovation in China, Europe and India”. The project explored 
to what extent, how and why technological pathways differ across countries. Case studies 
were conducted in two technological fields, electromobility and wind-power technologies, 
in China, India and leading European countries. Whether a diversity of pathways emerges 
or a small number of designs becomes globally dominant has important implications. 
From an environmental perspective, diversity may help to mobilise a wide range of talents 
and resources and deliver more context-specific solutions. Convergence, on the other 
hand, might help to exploit economies of scale and thereby bring about bigger and faster 
reductions in the cost of new technologies. From an economic perspective, diversity may 
provide niches for many firms, whereas a globally dominant design is likely to favour 
concentration in a small number of global firms – which may or may not be the estab-
lished ones. Comparing European incumbents with Asian newcomers is particularly inter-
esting, because China and India might well become the gamechangers – responsible for 
most of the increase of CO2 emissions but also leading investors in green technology. In 
addition, the project explored lessons for international technology cooperation, emphasising 
ways to navigate the trade-offs between global objectives to mitigate climate change 
effects and national interests to enhance competitiveness and create green jobs locally. 
The project was carried out between 2011 and 2014 as a joint endeavour of four 
institutions: the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungs-
politik (DIE), the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Brighton, the Indian Institute of 
Technology (IIT) Delhi and the School of Public Policy at Tsinghua University, with 
additional collaborators from the Universities of Aalborg, London and Frankfurt. The 
project was truly collaborative, to the extent that international teams jointly conducted 
interviews in China, India and Europe which helped to build common understanding.  
Eight reports have been published in, or are currently being finalised for, the DIE 
Discussion Paper series: 
(1) Altenburg, Tilman (2014): From combustion engines to electric vehicles: a study of 
technological path creation and disruption 
(2) Bhasin, Shikha (2014): Enhancing international technology cooperation for climate 
change mitigation: lessons from an electromobility case study 
(3) Chaudhary, Ankur (2014): Electromobility in India: attempts at leadership by 
businesses in a scant policy space 
(4) Lema, Rasmus / Johan Nordensvärd / Frauke Urban / Wilfried Lütkenhorst (2014): 
Innovation paths in wind power: insights from Denmark and Germany  
(5) Schamp, Eike W. (2014): The formation of a new technological trajectory of 
electric propulsion in the French automobile industry  
(6) Ling, Chen / Doris Fischer / Shen Qunhong / Yang Wenhui (forthcoming): Electric 
vehicles in China: bridging political and market logics 
(7) Dai, Yixin / Yuan Zhou / Di Xia / Mengyu Ding / Lan Xue (forthcoming): Innovation 
paths of the Chinese wind power industry 
(8) Narain, Ankita / Ankur Chaudhary / Chetan Krishna (forthcoming): The wind power 
industry in India. 
On the basis of these case studies, the team is currently working on a series of cross-
country comparative analyses to be published in academic journals.  
The research team is very grateful for generous funding and the very supportive attitude of 
the Swedish Riksbankens Jubileumsfond under a joint call with the Volkswagen 
Foundation and Compagnia de San Paolo.  
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1 Introduction 
Climate change is one of the greatest global challenges facing human civilisation today. To 
limit its most disastrous effects, global solutions need to be found and spread in a short period 
of time. The central pillar of the global climate regime, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has so far not been able to trigger sufficient 
policy responses to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.1 In this paper, we seek to 
understand whether international cooperation can fare better in the space of low-carbon 
technology cooperation – a critical input for climate change mitigation (Dechezleprêtre et al., 
2010). Thus we ask: What are the prospects for international technology cooperation in 
low-carbon sectors?  
In order to answer the above question, we studied the ongoing technology cooperation 
between China and Germany – both strong protagonists in the global climate regime. China 
has been leading the investment race in clean energy sectors (Pew 2012), but is also the 
largest emitter of GHGs globally (EIA 2012). Germany has the largest per capita 
investments in clean energy (BMUB 2012), is a leader in low-carbon technology 
innovations and is amongst the largest propagators of climate change mitigation globally. 
Moreover, trade relations between the two offer an interesting dynamic to comment on 
international technology cooperation. Germany is China’s biggest trading partner in Europe, 
while China is Germany’s biggest non-EU export market after the United States (Bryant 
2013). Despite economic competition in the international market between the two, their 
bilateral relationship is of strategic importance to both nations. 
In this paper, we limit our focus to the unfolding case of electromobility as a low-carbon 
sector. 20% of global carbon emissions originate from the transportation sector. Electric 
vehicles (EVs) are a relatively new technology, emerging in varying trajectories around the 
world (Altenburg / Bhasin / Fischer 2012). EVs are also complex technological products 
that require comprehensive systemic interventions in order to take off – in terms of research 
and development (R&D), infrastructural development and new incentive systems. We 
ultimately aim to offer recommendations that may help expedite the development and 
diffusion of electric vehicles through cooperation between China and Germany.  
Both China and Germany are critical global players. Already, China has emerged as the 
largest production centre and market for automobiles, despite its car ownership levels (44 
cars per 1,000 people) (National Bureau of Statistics China 2011 in Stark 2012) being much 
below the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) average (550 
cars per 1,000 people) (OECD 2013). This is expectedly on an upward rise – as per the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 71% of its transport energy demands will originate 
from road vehicles by 2015 in a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario (IEA 2011). Studies 
estimate that (EVs) could save 50% of China’s primary energy demand, and 35% of GHG 
emissions (for example, see Watson et al. 2011). The automobile sector is also amongst 
                                                            
1 The number of member countries at the time of establishment was 41 (Annex I), and now includes 44 
countries (http://maps.unfccc.int/di/map). The current pledges made by countries to limit emissions will at 
best lead to six degrees of warming, 4 degrees higher than the tipping point that would lead to disastrous 
consequences (see http://www.pwc.co.uk/sustainability-climate-change/publications/low-carbon-economy-
index-overview.jhtml). 
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Germany’s most strategic, directly employing over seven hundred thousand people (Federal 
Government of Germany 2012). In keeping with the sectors’ strategic nature, as well as the 
ambition of cutting its GHG emissions by 40 percent2 by 2020, Germany intends to 
become the leading smart mobility market and provider in the coming years (Germany 
Trade and Invest 2012).  
1.1 Trade-offs of international technological cooperation in low-carbon 
technologies  
The global goods perspective suggests that international technological cooperation 
should be maximised in an effort to decarbonise the global economy. Towards this end, 
it is desirable that low-carbon technologies be developed and deployed as soon as 
possible. Unrestricted global diffusion of technological know-how, however, is not in 
the interest of the owners of low-carbon technologies (in most cases private businesses) 
who earn innovation rents from their technological advancement. Moreover, mitigation 
technologies are amongst the fastest growing industries globally – for example, the solar 
energy sector has grown by over 30% annually in the past twenty years (SolarBuzz 
2010). Thus, firms and nations where these firms originate from, want to create and 
capitalise on their own first-mover advantage and knowledge to maintain 
competitiveness in the global economy. Technology cooperation is therefore obstructed 
by the need to protect one’s own economic growth.  
Future greenhouse gas emissions are expected to emerge predominantly from less-
developed economies3 – their share is set to increase to over 70% of global emissions in 
the next three decades (IPCC 2013). Whilst these countries have historically contributed 
less to climate change than developed countries, without their adoption of low-carbon 
development paths, the stabilisation of atmospheric temperatures is impossible to 
achieve. However, low-carbon/environment-friendly technologies urgently required to 
mitigate GHG emissions emerging from fast-growing emerging economies and less-
developed countries to avoid further lock-in have been developed primarily in 
industrialised countries. For example, the Clean Energy Patent Growth Index shows that 
the United States leads the number of patents gained in clean energy technologies in 
2012 accruing more than 14,000 patents, followed by Japan and Germany leading the 
technical patent race with more margin compared to the rest of the world combined 
(Heslin Rothenberg Farley and Mesiti Intellectual Property Law 2012). Ensuring their 
global diffusion thus entails considerable policy and economic challenges because 
developing countries are unable to do so without adequate knowledge and capacity-
building. Moreover, they are reluctant to bear the financial costs of catching up through 
sustainable means, given the environmental costs that the markets do not yet internalise.  
Thus, financing and building up technological capacity needs to be supported by 
developed countries if climate change concerns are to be tackled (Sauter / Watson 2008). 
                                                            
2 Baseline for emissions: 1990. 
3 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) includes all non-Annex I countries in its 
developing country cohort, explained in the following paragraph. 
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Moreover, the above mentioned countries have a historical responsibility as early 
industrialised and polluting nations towards less-developed ones, which finds resonance 
within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The historical 
responsibility is enshrined in the principles of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ 
(CBDR) and Firewalls that established the original Annex I and Non-Annex I lists of 
nations. These lists were based on the fact that 70% of the emissions originated from 
developed or Annex I countries back in 1990, taken as the base year for emissions 
reduction when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated (IPCC 2013). However, while these 
principles were accepted when the Protocol came into existence, how the burden of such 
financing and development assistance should be shared amongst the early industrialisers 
or Annex I countries has not yet been formulated. 
The trade-off between national growth objectives based on the increasing value of low-
carbon technologies, and the need to make the pertinent technologies affordable and 
accelerate their diffusion to lower the pace of global warming makes low-carbon 
technology cooperation inherently conflicting and yet a critical global dilemma that 
needs to be re-addressed urgently.  
1.2 Aim and structure of this paper 
Finding a way to cut through this trade-off towards a solution is enormously complex. 
The main question that we wish to address is: What are the prospects for 
international technological cooperation in the field of low-carbon technologies? We 
look to the case of electromobility to explore how the trade-offs are being managed by 
different actors undertaking international technological collaboration between Germany 
and China in this sector. Given the political nature of the trade-off and the focus on 
different actors, we attempt to answer the above question by framing our empirical 
findings around three critical points of analysis: (i) agenda-setting of the cooperation 
initiatives, (ii) sources of finance for cooperation initiatives, and (iii) the final division 
of ownership/property rights of the knowledge produced.  
The next section (Section 2) lays out the conceptual and analytical framework for the 
remainder of this paper. Section 3 then presents the case of the EV sectors in China and 
Germany, and analyses the ambitions, anticipated gains and the dominant agents of the 
technology cooperation currently underway between the two countries. Section 4 
presents the multilateral technological cooperation frameworks relating to 
electromobility in particular, but also highlights the potential of the upcoming 
“Technology Mechanism” of the UNFCCC as a pillar of climate change mitigation 
regime. Both Sections 3 and 4 show a lack of internationally coordinated efforts being 
implemented to accelerate the innovation and deployment of electromobility. Addressing 
this, Section 5 provides policy recommendations to re-address the gaps in international 
technology cooperation, such that electromobility as a low-carbon technology may 
develop rapidly. We do so primarily at a bilateral level of Sino-German engagement, and 
at the multilateral level through a focus on the emerging technology cooperation 
framework of the UNFCCC.  
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2 International technology cooperation: conceptual and analytical 
framework 
Answering questions on international technology cooperation’s prospects for low-carbon 
technology diffusion is a formidable challenge. There is no agreed effectiveness model 
which prescribes conditions and solutions through which to optimise international 
technology cooperation. Moreover, as indicated above, addressing the needs of global public 
goods – climate change mitigation in this case – is not just a matter of technical solutions 
but rather of political ones.  
We take the benefit of certain sets of literature to inform us of certain answers, and offer a 
minimum number of conceptual distinctions in order to unpack the processes and actors that 
are central to international technological cooperation.4 This section aims to do so by first 
defining international technology cooperation. I then elaborate on the central role of national 
and international policies in promoting the development of and cooperation in low-carbon 
technologies. Finally, I present our analytical framework that invokes critical issues of 
collaborative technology development and initiatives: agenda-setting, funding, and 
international property rights/knowledge gains. 
2.1 What is international technology cooperation?  
Access to and mastery of technology are widely accepted as being the basis of catching up 
with industrial and economic development; and international technological cooperation, as a 
means to this catch up, is a central factor in global development cooperation (Sampath / 
Roffe 2012; OECD 2012). However, the processes of technological transfers and 
cooperation, and which actors it should directly address, remain less certain (Sampath / 
Roffe 2012). Since its inception as a term 50 years ago, the idea of technology transfer is 
moving away from implying the transfer of hardware or external technologies. Consensus is 
emerging for international technological cooperation to signify technological capacity-
building in developing countries that seeks to cater to the entire technology cycle and its 
development. This stems from the understanding that technology is “too complex to be fully 
encompassed by either codified information or physical capital” (Bell / Pavitt 1996; in 
Huenteler / Schmidt 2012, 13). 
The UNFCCC remains the central pillar of the climate change regime, and the Cancun 
Agreements that emerged from its meeting there define technology development and 
transfer through the entire technology cycle. The UNFCCC recognises research and 
development, demonstration, deployment, diffusion and transfer of technologies as being a 
part of it (UNFCCC 2010). However, as Grubb (2008), Gallagher (2012) and others have 
pointed out, although these different “phases” in the technology cycle can be seen as 
distinctive activities, a purely linear interpretation of the innovation activities is “too 
simplistic”, and requires concerted linkages between different actors and contextual factors 
(Climate Strategies 2012, 1) (see Figure 1). As Sagar elaborates, “successful technological 
innovation is underpinned by ‘systems of innovation’ that comprise a range of actors and 
institutions that support various activities along the innovation chain” (Sagar 2010, 3).  
                                                            
4 These are taken from analytical insights available in the literature about international relations, the 
global public goods perspective, innovation systems, and technology transfer. If one were to review the 
literature from these schools of thought it would only provide limited added value to our discussion as 
it does not sufficiently highlight the relevance of the political nature of our questions. 
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Figure 1: Technology cycle for low-carbon technologies 
 
Source: Author 2013 (based on Grubb 2004; Sagar 2010) 
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sector (Bell / Figueiredo 2012; Lundvall 2005). Thus, technological sophistication, 
innovation systems, and the competitiveness of firms in developing economies is dependent 
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are involved in international technology cooperation, including different ministries and 
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and industrial associations. All of these are increasingly operating and cooperating at 
multiple levels – global, regional, national and local (Altenburg / Pegels 2012). The 
linkages between them, and the resultant technical cooperation, thus depend greatly on 
institutional and regulatory environments (BIAC / OECD 1996). We highlight this role of 
policy frameworks further in the following subsection.  
2.2 International technology cooperation: a policy imperative 
As discussed above, climate change mitigation requires a wide range of activities, actors and 
institutions to partake in international technology cooperation – and that too under 
considerable time pressure. Research estimates that current ambitions to mitigate climate 
change are a far cry from the reductions in GHG emission levels required to limit global 
warming to a two-degree target, set as the tipping point if the catastrophic impacts of 
climate change are to be avoided. Widespread mitigation efforts are required to meet this 
mammoth challenge in a short period of time. Since many countries are still grappling 
with industrialisation and economic development, and given the uncertainties that 
accompany technology choices and market opportunities, a mix of international and 
national frameworks are needed to encourage further experimentation, development and 
adoption of low-carbon technologies so that they can detract from the locked-in paths of 
carbon-dependent economic development that are dominant today. To mobilise capacity 
and ambition within various different developed and less-developed countries to do so, 
international cooperation initiatives, both bilateral and multilateral, have the potential to 
play a critical role in transitioning to low-carbon development globally.  
Although the private sector remains the dominant protagonist within technology 
development and deployment globally5, for low-carbon technologies to be diffused and for 
technological cooperation to occur at an optimal pace for the protection of global goods, a 
strong policy imperative at the domestic, bilateral and multilateral level is required as a 
first. This is mainly for two reasons: one, the externalisation of environmental costs makes 
low-carbon technology products un-competitive compared to the conventional carbon-
intensive counterparts. Secondly, the social benefits or the global goods advantages of 
low-carbon technology innovations cannot be fully realised by individual firms (United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 2010). Thus, the pace at which investments are 
needed to optimise low-carbon development to curtail climate change needs to be 
incentivised.  
As Altenburg and Pegels (2012) affirm, the timely transition to low-carbon technological 
pathways being adopted and adapted requires that concerted policy transitions and 
frameworks be developed throughout the entire innovation systems. The spread of low-
carbon technology cooperation requires such an approach of sustainability-oriented 
innovation systems, where various dimensions of tackling market failures, differing trade-offs, 
and embedded institutional characteristics are coordinated through policies. This works at 
multiple levels of governance, and requires coordination between national and international 
frameworks as well (Altenburg / Pegels 2012).  
                                                            
5 Two-thirds of the investment in low-carbon technology comes from the private sector (see OECD 
2013). 
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These factors ring especially true for electromobility which is in need of a concerted public 
policy push throughout its innovation cycle. The transition to electric vehicles requires 
simultaneous development and changes in product design, production processes, infra-
structure, consumer behaviour, incumbent institutional and industrial actors, and a combi-
nation of different subsystems therein. Thus, the challenge of simultaneous technological 
breakthroughs (in batteries, chargers, consumer interfaces, and infrastructure, for example) 
as well as encouraging organisational innovations in order to accelerate a transition to EVs 
as a mobility concept remains to be met (Altenburg / Bhasin / Fischer 2012).  
As the central institutional pillar governing the international climate change regime, the 
UNFCCC has a very important role to play in accelerating the transition to low-carbon 
sustainable development as a global norm. According to Abbott and Snidal  
states consciously use international organisations both to reduce transaction costs in 
the narrow sense and, more broadly, to create information, ideas, norms, and 
expectations; to carry out and encourage specific activities; to legitimate or 
delegitimate particular ideas and practices; and to enhance their capacities and 
power. These functions constitute IOs [international organisations] as agents, which, 
in turn, influence the interests, intersubjective understandings, and environment of 
states (Abbott / Snidal 1998, 7). 
Despite not being able to elicit enough ambition from countries to reduce their absolute 
emissions, as an international organisation the UNFCCC has successfully created various 
mechanisms and instruments to bring the issue of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation to the fore. It has also constitutionalised the protection of weaker states, 
labelled as Non-Annex I countries, with support from the Annex I countries.6 As its 
Technology Mechanism emerges, there is potential for it to create a global norm on 
international technology cooperation such that it aides comprehensive capability building 
across the innovation cycle in less-developed countries.  
While the Technology Mechanism could become transformational in accelerating 
international technology cooperation, bilateral and domestic initiatives are just as critical. 
The implementation of international treaties and norms depends on domestic capacities and 
regulatory frameworks. Bilateral and national initiatives urgently need to underscore goals 
to develop and deploy low-carbon technologies such that this leads countries away from 
fossil fuel-based economic structures. Research has affirmed that even when international 
treaties do not bind countries to commitments, they may act as a soft power tool for states 
not to go against their agreed objectives (Yang 2012; Townshend / Matthews 2013). For 
example, soon after the drawing up of the Montreal Protocol, seen as amongst the most 
successful environmental agreements to have been implemented, the EU and the United 
States (collectively responsible for emitting over 80% of ozone-depleting substances at the 
time) brought out regulations that validated and helped achieve the goals of the Protocol. 
Currently, the lack of mitigation ambition in most countries across the globe is undermining 
the prioritisation of addressing and curbing climate change. For low-carbon technological 
cooperation to find more success regardless of a global deal on climate change, domestic 
and bilateral cooperation initiatives that bring together relevant actors and institutions for 
low-carbon technological development and deployment can significantly encourage setting 
the stage for a global norm towards this end. At the same time, the multilateral framework 
                                                            
6 A deeper discussion of the role and potential of the UNFCCC is addressed in Section 4. 
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must facilitate and establish procedures for norm creation, elaboration and coordination 
amongst different countries, thereby enhancing cooperation. 
Thus, it is a mix of multilateral, bilateral and domestic frameworks, as well as public- and 
private-sector actors, that establish and partake of these frameworks which align and 
enable a low-carbon technology and sector to develop successfully. Literature from the 
innovations systems approach recognises that no one actor (individual/firm/government) 
has the ability to transform technological development and diffusion (Foxon / Pearson 
2008). Thus, the need for different actors to come together – cutting through the public 
and private divide – in order to stimulate technological development is a critical basis for 
technological development and cooperation.  
2.3 Managing the trade-offs, financing and international property rights (IPR) 
protection: analytical framework 
Given the multitude of actors and spheres of interaction that need to be coordinated through 
policy interventions to drive a transition to electromobility, a spurt of alliances have been 
formed, cutting through the public- and private-sector divide, as will be shown in the next 
section. However, despite having encouraged alliance-building to research, develop and 
cooperate on electromobility, the underlying differing motivations behind these actions still 
remain. These differing motivations of participating agents of cooperation create trade-offs 
that impact the cooperation-initiatives’ funding structures, their ambitions, and their 
implementation. We attempt to understand how these trade-offs are managed in bilateral and 
multilateral spheres of electromobility cooperation; and how they impact the climate 
mitigation efforts through electromobility development. 
Keeping the above in mind, we suggest the following dimensions to understand the 
prospect of international technological cooperation in Germany’s and China’s electric 
vehicle sectors. The most relevant aspect underlying these dimensions stems from the fact 
that it is not distinct institutions and actors that undertake technology cooperation but 
rather alliances formed through public spending and engaging across national borders. 
Thus, we identify three aspects of cooperative design and ask 
i. Who sets the agenda? This relates directly to the management of ambitions and 
trade-offs inherent in international technology cooperation across differing actors, 
firms, and institutions.  
ii. Who funds the cooperation activities? This addresses how the cases of 
international cooperation are financed, and whether the financing actors have a 
greater leeway in agenda-setting over the other practitioners. 
iii. Who gains the ownership of knowledge and intellectual property rights? This seeks 
to understand how different cooperation alliances and actors approach ownership of 
generated knowledge and technological products, as well as capacity development.  
These questions offer a means of assessing and analysing the political economy of ongoing 
cooperative activities in the space of electromobility. I aim to present recommendations for a 
mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Germany and to comment on the 
technology cooperation framework of the UNFCCC as a tool for leveraging and accelerating 
increased technology cooperation in low-carbon sectors globally.  
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3 International technology cooperation: Sino-German bilateral initiatives 
in the electromobility sector 
The above two sections have highlighted the relevance of the case of electromobility adoption, 
as well as the central role of international technology cooperation for the development and 
adoption of low-carbon technologies in less-developed economies. In order to assess the 
bilateral cooperation underway between China and Germany in electromobility, a brief 
assessment of the policy and technical aspects of the EV sectors in both countries is given. 
After that, the bilateral spheres of cooperation that have been announced and are currently 
being implemented are analysed and discussed, using our analytical framework that 
emphasises the basis of their priority setting, sources of financing, and eventual impact/gain. 
3.1 Policy and technological contexts: space for cooperation? 
German EV competency and objectives: The Federal Government of Germany is 
promoting electric mobility as a key area of innovation and action to help achieve its 
national emissions reduction targets, secure itself from petroleum dependence, enhance 
German competitiveness in mobility solutions, and transform Germany into a lead market 
and provider for electric cars (BMVI 2011). It aims to have one million electric vehicles 
operational in Germany by 2020 and to increase this number to six million by 2030. To 
support these ambitions and gear itself as a lead market and provider for electric vehicles, a 
National Platform for Electromobility (NPE) was set up in May 2010.7 By the end of 2011, 
the platform had more than 140 members and was organised through seven working streams 
to address different aspects of electromobility development, ranging from norms and 
standards, drive train and systems integration, to battery technology.8 A Ministerial Joint 
Unit was established as a basis for the NPE, under the auspices of the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi, formerly the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology) and the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI, 
formerly the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development). This Joint 
Unit also included the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building 
and Nuclear Safety (BMUB, formerly the Federal Ministry of the Environment) and the 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) as the other two members, to 
coordinate the different issues and challenges of electromobility, and support the broad 
member-base so that a political capture of interests would be less likely. However, it is 
commonly accepted that most of the agenda of this platform is industry-led. 
It is significant to take cognisance of two international developments that triggered Germany’s 
interest in electromobility. Firstly, the European Union (EU) imposed emission norms on all 
European fleet manufacturers to lower the overall emissions of fleets, much to Germany’s 
opposition as its automobile manufacturers are particularly well established in the premium 
car market; and, secondly, there was a dramatic rise in the global consensus towards electric 
                                                            
7 This includes stakeholders from the government, civil society, industry and academia as members and 
is currently in its pre-market phase, set to run until 2014, where the emphasis is on research and 
development, and on setting up a few large-scale electric mobility showcases. 
8  The seven work areas are: Drive technology; battery technology; charging infrastructure and network 
integration; standardization and certification; materials and recycling; qualification and training; 
framework conditions. For more information on the Platform, please refer to NPE 2011.  
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vehicles as a future mobility solution when China, as the largest single market for 
automobiles globally, joined the EV bandwagon with ambitious national targets alongside 
the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and other leading international car 
manufacturers. Thus, it was competitive (re)positioning as well as the mandate of 
emissions reductions that formed the basis for Germany’s ambitions in electromobility 
(Altenburg / Bhasin / Fischer 2012).  
Since Germany’s dominant source of energy remains fossil fuels, the government’s 
electromobility programme also established that the additional electricity needed for these 
vehicles should be sourced from renewable sources (NPE 2011). Germany is undertaking 
rapid development of renewable energy in its electricity mix which will supplement its EV 
ambitions. Moreover, integrating electric vehicles with smart applications and 
technologies that interact with the grid to tackle power supply fluctuations, energy storage 
from renewable sources, and net-metering have become strong focus areas for research in 
Germany – almost 25% of the NPE budget has been apportioned for information and 
communication technologies (ICT) and energy systems integrations, and recycling 
linkages (NPE 2011). A SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis 
undertaken by the NPE to assess Germany’s electromobility sector identified its leading 
position in industrial ICT; energy technologies; and established expertise in constructing 
complex system technologies as its biggest advantages. It also identified battery 
technology as the main area of weakness in its innovation system pertaining to 
electromobility (German Federal Government 2009). 
Chinese EV competency and objectives: China has been attempting industrial catch up by 
developing its automobile sector and provisioning investments in manufacturing and 
technological innovation through concerted efforts over several decades. However, it has not 
yet been able to compete at par with conventional car incumbents globally. A few years ago, 
this led to a change in emphasis towards electromobility (Wang / Kimble 2011). Highlighting 
electromobility as a priority emerging industry in its 12th Five Year Plan, China’s Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology released a guiding document, “Draft development plan 
for the energy efficient and new energy car industry (2011–2020)”, that aims for China’s 
production capacity and sale of electric vehicles to reach 5 million by 2020. 
In addition to wanting to gain industrial and market leadership in electric vehicles (and the 
entailed value chain) (Wu 2012; Altenburg / Bhasin / Fischer 2012), China is looking to 
electromobility as a solution to curbing its high oil imports and improving its increasing local 
air pollution levels.9 Climate change mitigation, in contrast, is not the main motivation behind 
China’s EV emissions as electricity is and will continue to be primarily sourced from coal-
fired power plants.10 
Supporting policies from the government are aimed at both the demand and supply sides, 
and include financial subsidies on purchase, tax breaks and reductions, demonstration 
projects, incentives for R&D, charging infrastructure, and a targeted experimentation in 25 
cities in China. The overall financial support is expected to be approximately EUR 11 
billion (Altenburg / Bhasin / Fischer 2012). The government in China has already provided 
                                                            
9 Interview with an implementing agency member (see Annex 2). 
10 Coal will remain the dominant source of power generation in China, responsible for about 50% of 
power generation until 2050 (Zhou et al. 2011). 
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EUR 0.25 billion in R&D and demonstration support, and this is expected to increase 
tenfold within the coming decade (Watson et al. 2011; Lema / Lema 2012).  
However, official reports suggest that the uptake of electric vehicles in China is far behind 
the targets set by the government. For instance, in the 25 cities that were selected to 
“experiment with energy efficient and new energy vehicles”, the number of cars sold is only 
one-fifth of the anticipated target, and the majority have been purchased by the government 
itself (Green Book of Economic Information accessed in Xinhua 2012). The biggest reason 
cited for this slow-growth has been ‘limits in technical maturity’, in addition to 
infrastructure, vehicle performance, and economic efficiencies.11 Other reports from 
consultants also cite technical immaturity, and lack of infrastructure and standardisation as 
being the obstacles in EV-rollouts in China (China Daily 2013). In China, the production 
capacity set up in anticipation of the ambitious targets set by the government has outpaced 
the innovative acumen needed for EV rollout (Watson et al. 2011). In particular battery 
technology for EVs is considered to be one of the main bottlenecks for the Chinese 
development of this industry. This is interestingly the case despite initial speculation of 
China being able to lead on this particular technology front, given its experience and 
expertise in LED-based and other components of battery technology. Moreover, 
international counterparts have a much better handle on materials technologies and battery 
management systems required for EV batteries (Watson et al. 2011). 
Although the sales of EVs have not matched up with the targets set, China has still 
amongst the largest fleet of EVs sold globally12 and has the largest market for e-bikes in 
the world. This market has been established mainly through indigenous technology, but 
there are several weaknesses in different parts of the innovation system. Moreover, while 
the domestic market size for EVs could be potentially the largest globally and remains the 
largest automobile market, the demand for EVs is yet unproven.  
Scope for cooperation: It is clear that China has not yet been able to acquire the expertise 
required for a cohesive EV rollout in its own market, particularly for high-end consumers 
(Watson et al. 2011). As Huenteler and Schmidt (2012) explain, EVs consist of  
thousands of customized components, automotive innovations require extensive 
simulation, testing, fine-tuning, and continuous improvements ... At the same time, 
manufacturers plan and run large production facilities and have to coordinate 
global supply chains to bring down manufacturing costs, making subsequent 
production engineering necessary for any modification of the product (Huenteler / 
Schmidt 2012).  
It is a very complex technological output, and while China has been able to upscale its 
production capacity, its quality of production and innovative capabilities is inadequate. 
Given the above, the innovation system of China’s EV sector is increasingly seeking to gain 
from foreign joint ventures: the recently launched China Programme on Electromobility 
Development mandates that all foreign manufacturers have to develop a new Chinese brand 
of cars, that are to be New Energy Vehicles, in cooperation with a Chinese company if they 
are interested in setting up manufacturing units there. It is a clear stipulation that aims to 
enable China’s technological capabilities and innovation potential to grow. All major car 
                                                            
11 Reported by interviewees. 
12 China ranked 5th globally in domestic EV sales in 2011 (Frost & Sullivan 2012). 
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producers are following in line because China presents a market that they cannot afford to 
ignore. Table 1 presents a synoptic capture of the proposed cooperation products and 
partners of German carmakers with counterparts in China, reflective of the Chinese mandate 
on foreign carmakers. The R&D outputs of these joint ventures are yet to reach 
commercialisation stages and have not been introduced to the market. Moreover, the lack of 
standards and regulations are delaying production and design outputs of EVs in China. 
Reportedly, there is also reluctance from firms to release their products onto the market for 
fear of imitation at this early stage of development (Watson et al. 2011).  
Table 1: Firm-level cooperation (German and Chinese) to develop electric vehicles 
German 
company 
Chinese  
counterpart 
Anticipated  
product 
Form of 
cooperation and 
technology-
sharing 
mechanism 
Current status 
BMW 
Brilliance BMW 5 Series 
Sedan 
Joint Venture, 
manufacturing plant 
owned by Brilliance 
Corporation 
Shown at the Shanghai 
Auto Show 2012 (BMW 
Blog 2011) 
Tongji  
University 
ECHO Joint research  
project 
Shown at the Beijing 
Motor Show 2010 (BMW 
Blog 2010) 
City of Shanghai Mini E City and product 
testing 
Being tested in Shanghai, 
Beijing and Shandong as 
part of the BMW 
worldwide pilot test 
programme (China 
Economic Net 2012) 
Daimler/ 
Mercedes 
BYD Denza, electric 
vehicle 
Joint venture, 50:50 Shown at the Beijing Auto 
Show in 2012. Both  
companies claim it is 
slated for release in 2013 
(Daimler 2012) 
Audi 
FAW, Tongji 
University13 
Plug-in hybrid  
sedan, A6 L  
e-tron 
Joint venture Shown at the China Auto 
Show Beijing 2012 (The 
GreenCar 2012) 
Volkswagen 
SAIC Motor 
Corporation 
(Bloomberg 
2011) 
A China-specific 
E car 
Joint venture Slated to be developed by 
201814 
FAW  
Corporation 
(Bloomberg 
2011) 
Kaili and Tantos 
and E Bora, all 
electric cars  
(AutoBlog Green, 
2010; 2011) 
Joint venture Production said to begin 
in 2014 (China Car Times 
2012) 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
                                                            
13 Reported by interviewees. 
14 Reported by interviewees. 
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The companies listed above in Table 1 are amongst the heavyweights of Germany’s 
automobile sector. As mentioned earlier, this is the largest industrial sector in Germany, and 
also the most innovative (Bitonto / Kolbe / MacDougall 2012). Since over 75% percent of the 
cars manufactured in Germany are sold in other countries, it is a critical sector for Germany’s 
international competitiveness and economic concerns (Bitonto / Kolbe / MacDougall 2012). 
Not surprisingly, it shares a close relationship with government agencies that undertake 
bilateral cooperation with strategic markets.  
The details of firm-level technological cooperation being undertaken through these listed 
Sino-German joint ventures are not available and were not possible to attain, given their 
strategic value for companies. Details of patent protection and implementation, the system of 
knowledge production and sharing, as well as consequences on production processes and 
employment gains in both countries are undisclosed and their influence is yet to unfold in each 
nation’s electric vehicle technology trajectory. Hence, we look to the publically funded 
bilateral technological cooperation in the next section to assess the prospective role of public 
policy in driving international technology cooperation, its anticipated benefit to the Chinese 
and German EV innovation systems, and to what degree these strategic partnerships accelerate 
the protection of the global climate good, and the local environment. 
3.2 Assessing Sino-German national-level bilateral cooperation in 
electromobility  
Germany and China initiated and signed a bilateral agreement on science and technology 
(S&T) in 1978. The S&T commission that got formed as a result meets every two years 
generally to coordinate cooperation between Germany and China. Within this framework, the 
first Intergovernmental Consultation between China and Germany took place in June 2011, 
where both governments signed a memorandum of understanding to create a strategic 
partnership in the field of electric mobility. The central objectives of this partnership were to 
intensify cooperation in standardisation and to strengthen collaboration between research 
centres, companies and local governments. The second Intergovernmental Consultation was 
held in August 2012, and its official declaration states: 
The automotive industry, and particularly the innovative field of electric mobility, is 
very important to the economies of both countries. Both sides are committed to 
intensifying cooperation in the field of vehicle fuel efficiency, including as regards 
standards for CO2 emissions from motor vehicles. Both sides will further intensify 
cooperation within the framework of the German-Chinese platform for electric mobility 
as well as cooperation on the German and Chinese demonstration projects in the field 
of electric mobility. The two sides will discuss collaborating on setting up 
demonstration projects in the field of charging infrastructure and the interaction 
between electric mobility and the electric vehicle smart grid (Joint declaration on the 
second Sino-German Intergovernmental Consultations 2012).  
Thus, there is a very clear high-level diplomatic positioning of cooperation between the 
two countries on various different aspects of electric vehicles. The Joint Unit of key 
German ministries responsible for electromobility established a large-scale cooperation 
initiative with Chinese counterparts in 2010. This initiative has the following components 
(see Table 2). 
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Although the above initiatives were announced between 2010 and 2012, information on 
their stages of implementation is sparse. On the basis of interviews with ministries and 
implementation agencies located in Germany and China15, I found that the only real 
spheres of cooperation that are currently being implemented through these government-
enabled mechanisms can be clubbed into basic joint-research efforts, and the cooperation 
on efforts mentioned below. The critical design elements of these aims are assessed, 
namely: Who finances the initiatives and, finally, who gains? That is: Does the initiative 
only benefit the competitive advantage of either of the two countries or does it benefit 
mitigation concerns from a global goods perspective. This discussion and the subsequent 
conclusions are presented in Section 3. Below is a description of these initiatives 
highlighting their financing, agenda, and impact characteristics.  
Research on electromobility  
i (a) The BMBF (Germany) and MoST (China) signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) for scientific cooperation in the field of e-mobility in 2010 and several joint 
projects in the field of basic research for electromobility are to be operationalised 
through this partnership (EU 2012). The first of these was established between the 
                                                            
15 See Appendix 1 for the interview list. 
Table 2: Initiatives established between German and Chinese government agencies for  
technology cooperation on electromobility 
Federal Ministry of 
Transport and Digital 
Infrastructure (formerly 
the Federal Ministry of 
Transport, Building and 
Urban Development) 
(BMVI) 
Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and 
Energy (formerly the 
Federal Ministry of 
Economics and  
Technology)  
(BMWi) 
Federal Ministry of 
Education and  
Research, Germany 
(BMBF) 
Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building 
and Nuclear Safety (for-
merly the Federal 
Ministry of the Environ-
ment) Germany (BMUB) 
Sustainable Fuel  
Partnership 
Partner: Ministry of 
Science and  
Technology, China 
(MoST) 
Industrialisation 
Partner: Ministry of 
Industry and 
Information  
Technology, China 
(MIIT) 
“Electric Car  
Centre” 
Partner: Ministry of 
Science and  
Technology, China 
(MoST) 
Climate and  
the Environment 
Partner: Ministry of 
Science and  
Technology, China 
(MoST) 
Sustainable Fuel  
Partnership 
Partner: Ministry of 
Science and  
Technology, China 
(MoST) 
Certification  
Partner: General 
Administration of 
Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and 
Quarantine (AQSIQ) 
Battery Recycling 
Partner: National  
Development and  
Reform Commission 
(NDRC) 
Cooperation on Model 
Regions 
Partner: Ministry of 
Science and  
Technology, China 
(MoST) 
Standardisation 
Partner: Standards 
Administration of 
China (SAC) 
Fuel Economy 
Partner: Ministry of 
Industry and  
Information  
Technology, China 
(MIIT) 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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Association of German Technical Universities (TU9), to be led by the Technical 
University Munich (TUM), and a group of Chinese universities (Tongji University is 
to be coordinating lead) in April 2012. It will receive funding of EUR 3.5 million from 
the BMBF (TU9 2012). At present, the universities are deliberating on the topics of 
research to be undertaken over the next years. The MoU had identified five projects 
relating to energy conversion and storage, drive concepts, communication and 
infrastructure as a priority. Interviewees from the government and implementation 
agencies stated that this cooperation on basic electromobility was initiated on Chinese 
insistence – Germany’s BMBF was a “reluctant” partner to engage in scientific 
cooperation at a university level on electromobility, allegedly for fear of brain drain 
and a general sense of trust deficit with China. With regards to the outcome achieved, 
IPR and patent protection rules that universities in Germany have created and uphold 
for their research outcomes will most likely be applied.16 These are based on the EU’s 
“Commission Recommendation of 10 April 2008 on the management of intellectual 
property in knowledge transfer activities and Code of Practice for universities and 
other public research organisations”. TUM, the German lead university in this 
initiative, has an IPR policy which stipulates that all knowledge produced must be 
utilised to provide maximum benefits to society through extensive dissemination, 
while simultaneously bringing economic benefits to the creators and to the university 
by supporting business entities to manage invented products that exploit university-
generated knowledge.17 The income derived is to be shared between the inventor(s) as 
provided by the Employee Inventions Act. However, it is not clear at this stage what 
sort of legal frameworks have been drawn up to address the knowledge generated 
through this bilateral initiative.18 This initiative will involve research-capacity building 
and familiarity between the scientific communities involved of the two countries, since 
“intensive exchange of students and scientists between the two countries is also 
planned” (TU9 2012). 
i (b) Given that electromobility ambitions were initiated in China for reasons other than 
climate change mitigation concerns, the BMUB suggested undertaking a joint 
assessment of electric vehicles in China, to highlight the overall environmental 
impact of electromobility through a life-cycle assessment. Its aim is to analyse and 
recommend to policymakers the potential for decentralised urban grids and 
renewable energy production to improve the environmental sustainability impact of 
electromobility. At the time of finalising this paper, the life-cycle assessment of 
Chinese fleets was being concluded.19 This study is being carried out by the School 
of Environment at Tsinghua University (Beijing) and the Öko-Institut e.V. in 
Germany. According to officials overseeing this cooperation, the presence of the 
Öko-Institut supplements policy and scientific advice based on their expertise on 
electromobility planning within Germany20 and is to assure quality control of the 
research that experts at Tsinghua University are producing.21 This cooperative 
                                                            
16 Interviews with the officials concerned at the universities were not granted/conducted. 
17 For more information, see policy at http://www.forte.tum.de/fileadmin/w00bgt/www/_application_pdf-
Objekt_engl.pdf.  
18 Interviews with the officials concerned at the universities have not yet been granted/conducted. 
19 October 2013 
20 See, for example, http://www.oeko.de/research_consultancy/issues/sustainable_mobility/dok/1242.php.  
21 Information based on interview responses. 
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initiative is entirely funded by the BMUB. The policy recommendations that will 
emerge from this seek to feed into China’s climate change/emissions mitigation 
strategy; however, the buy-in from Chinese government officials towards this is 
seemingly minimal. Instead, it is the GIZ, the overarching implementation agency 
for the BMUB’s cooperation initiatives on electromobility in China, which plans to 
communicate and make the recommendations known amongst the Chinese public.  
i (c) The BMUB is also working with the Ministry of Transportation in China to analyse 
the inclusion of EVs in the public transportation systems. A report that underlines 
the guidelines for EV readiness in Chinese cities will be prepared by the Tongji 
University, under the aegis of BMUB funding. The incentives and infrastructure 
needs that it will highlighted are intended to be presented to the Chinese Academy of 
Mayors by the BMUB. This directly reflects the BMUB’s motivations for 
facilitating EVs as a solution to climate change mitigation, as well as road 
congestion and air quality within Chinese cities. 
Norms, regulatory frameworks and standardisation  
As the electromobility sector emerges in differing trajectories across the globe, related 
certification standards and norms are emerging simultaneously and are yet to be standardised 
internationally. Having competing standards and norms creates different sets of rents and 
comes at additional prices to companies offering their products in foreign markets as they 
have to comply with these. China and Germany have bilateral committees working on norms 
and standardisation (detailed below), and this issue was an important clause of negotiation that 
was even brought into the high-level Second Intergovernmental Consultation between the two 
countries. Avoiding strategic negotiations and actions at this stage would only prove to be 
disadvantageous to German original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who would otherwise 
have to switch to Chinese standards to operate in the Chinese market. Since the Chinese 
market is anticipated to be one of the largest for EVs, it is only natural that political and 
technical agencies are trying to negotiate and cooperate with the Chinese on homogenising 
norms and standards conducive to German technology and know-how.  
ii (a) Within the industrialisation effort led by the BMWi in China, the only sphere of actual 
cooperation that is currently underway is the “Sino-German Standardisation 
Cooperation Commission” (Arnold 2011, and several interview responses). This 
working group was established by the BMWi and the Standards Administration of 
China (SAC). This is being routed through a sub-committee in the Standardization 
Commission of the German-Chinese Joint Committee of Industry and Trade (Arnold 
2011). Thus far, it is preparing a study that reflects the differences between Chinese 
and international standards on electromobility and as a next step plans to create a joint 
standardisation roadmap with the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) to unroll the private EV market in China.22 As per interviews with 
implementation agencies of the BMWi, a feasibility study that looks at prospective 
Sino-German cooperation on certification is also in the pipeline, to be released by the 
BMWi and the China Quality Certification Centre. Thus, we see that there is a great 
                                                            
22 A workshop was recently held by the GIZ in Beijing, bringing relevant stakeholders together for an 
informed dialogue on standardisation as a means of easing market access. For more, see http://China. 
ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_China/_temp_/Invitation_-_Sino-erman_Cooperation_and_Electro-Mobility 
_in_China.pdf.  
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deal of formal engagement being carried out by the BMWi with the aim of aligning 
German and Chinese standards and to ease German access to the Chinese market. 
Furthermore, this creates leverage for German OEMs to influence the EU’s 
standards and certifiable norms vis-à-vis electromobility, particularly since France 
has established standards varying from those of German OEMs and are continuing to 
further develop these. As technology development makes progress, norms and 
standards relating to safety regulations, technology connectors, and the interfaces 
between the cars and infrastructure will become binding regulations in large markets. 
Thus, the race to establish norms and regulations in cooperation with those that will be 
implemented in China are critical for car-makers with aspirations towards the Chinese 
EV market, to save on conversion costs to the standards adopted in China in order to 
be viable products there. For example, plug interfaces for the charging infrastructure 
have all been developed with different current and charge types in Germany, the 
United States, France, Japan and other countries. All these nations are trying to 
influence the Chinese standard of charging infrastructure to avoid conversion costs. 
Since different standards have emerged in the component technologies within EVs 
globally, there is currently an open debate on whether the United States, France or 
Germany will succeed in their negotiations and cooperation with China on this front. 
ii (b) Although still in the pipeline, the BMUB expects to work in close cooperation with the 
National Development and Reform Commission in China for the recycling of strategic 
components. At present, preparation of a feasibility study is under discussion between 
the two agencies to highlight the scope of such recycling, given the electromobility 
ambitions in China. To be finalised by the end of 2013, the BMUB then plans to create 
a large Sino-German working group in partnership with the BMWi and the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) that brings together car 
manufacturers, technology providers for recycling batteries, and waste management 
agencies from both countries as well as the province of Guangdong to undertake pilot 
testing of business models and recycling technologies. The financing for these 
strategic efforts towards recycling will be shared between the German BMUB and 
Chinese NDRC. Although the feasibility study is to be wholly funded by Germany, the 
working groups are hosted and financed by the respective countries twice a year. This 
strand of cooperation was developed out of an appraisal mission undertaken by the 
GIZ in China, and was put forth as an area of improvement in the EV value chain. 
Interviews with GIZ staff reported that the suggestion of this study and working group 
is based on the well-accepted need for German companies/OEMs to undertake 
sustainable recycling of their products’ components. As societal norms and company 
image reflecting sustainability concerns are well established in Germany, the BMUB 
approached the NDRC in China in order to influence the Chinese regulatory 
frameworks to reflect these standards and help facilitate raising the bar of 
environmental protection (local and global). It subsequently signed an MoU on the 
issue of strategic recycling of components in 2012. Thus, this strand of cooperation 
represents a case of raising the environmental standards of the Chinese EV system. 
The working group also gives German and Chinese companies the advantage of 
getting to know the market players, developing new partnerships with technology 
providers (for recycling), as well as framing the business and regulatory environment 
around these technologies.23  
                                                            
23 Confirmed in interviews. 
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3.3 Discussion and conclusions 
It must be noted that, despite the fact that a range of other cooperation initiatives have been 
announced in the past three years (presented in Table 2), only those highlighted above have 
been taken up and are operational. A synoptic view of these bilateral technological 
cooperation initiatives are presented in Table 3 below. Interview responses related to this 
mismatch between announced and operational cooperation initiatives suggest a lack of 
industrial backing and a deficit of trust in technology developers in China that government 
agencies do not feel equipped to deal with. Rather, they prefer to keep issues of actual 
knowledge development and IPR a prerogative of Germany companies.  
All of the initiatives underway are oriented towards policy and regulatory frameworks, 
rather than actual technological development and market readiness. For instance, several 
announced initiatives which deal with city-level demonstrations, development and testing of 
the technologies, cooperation on core technological development, and others that would lead 
to an increase in the innovation capacity of China have not yet been operationalised. Thus, 
we see that Germany is undertaking diplomatic cooperation with China that reinforces its 
industrial strategies in electromobility. Its focus on norms and standardisation, as the 
dominant operational channel of cooperation, is reflective of these competitive concerns; the 
rest is left to individual private-sector initiatives that conduct their work in China through 
private joint-ventures. On assessing these real spaces of cooperative action on 
electromobility within the bilateral framework, it is evident that Germany and China have 
both taken systematic steps to frame technology cooperation such that it builds competitive 
advantages for each country in this sector within the Chinese market.  
At the same time, the initiatives are also bringing emissions reduction and global goods 
protection through EVs into the Chinese policy-space as an important point of discussion. 
The early-stage cooperation that Germany is undertaking in China to bring out policy 
recommendations for the government in China draws attention to various environmental 
concerns relating to electromobility (see in Table 3: i. (b), i. (c), ii. (a), ii. (b)). These also 
reflect German ambitions and priorities, which stand for complying with a certain 
responsible environmentally-conscious image reflecting societal norms prevalent in 
Germany.  
Despite the fact that these MoUs having been signed two years ago and specific partners 
identified to undertake this cooperation, these initiatives have not yet been operationalised, 
suggesting a dominance of German ambitions over those regarded as critical points by 
China which drew them into the Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries: 
interviewees reported that China negotiated hard-to-specify ICT (information and 
communication technologies) interfaces for electric vehicles as an important technological 
area of cooperation with Germany, as it was for university-level research and city-
partnerships. However, IPR protection and trust deficit are a critical obstacle for cooperating 
with China and this was reported by all German stakeholders interviewed for this paper. 
Responding to these messages, interviewees from China invoked clauses of historical 
responsibility for the current state of climate change, and the need for less-developed 
countries to have financial and technical assistance from developed countries.  
At the national level, trade-offs for Germany and China when cooperating in electric 
vehicle technological development are summarised broadly in the table below (Table 4). 
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Table 3: Operational spheres of bilateral cooperation on electromobility in China 
Initiative Predominant actor in agenda-setting Funding agency 
IPR/knowledge 
ownership 
accrue to: 
Benefits accrue to: 
i (a) 
Established on Chinese 
insistence from the 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology  
Majority funding by 
the BMBF, 
Germany 
University legal 
frameworks will 
apply 
Chinese innovation 
system 
i (b) German BMUB BMUB, Germany Public domain Environmental impacts of EVs in China 
i (c) German BMUB BMUB, Germany Public domain Environmental impacts of EVs in China 
ii (a) German industry through the BMWi BMWi Public domain 
Environmental impacts 
of EVs in China;  
and German OEM  
competitiveness 
ii (b) 
German industry 
through the GIZ and 
BMUB 
70:30 partnership 
between the BMUB 
and the NDRC, 
respectively 
Public domain 
Environmental impacts 
of EVs in China;  
and German OEM  
competitiveness 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Table 4: National-level imperatives for technology cooperation in electromobility 
China’s and Germany’s objectives Scope of cooperation 
Reduce emissions globally Positive 
Reduce emissions from automobile sector nationally Positive 
Increase market access Mixed, depending on ‘rents’ and entry barriers 
Increase national industrial competitiveness, first-
mover advantage in electromobility  Negative 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
The initiatives being implemented highlight how differing motivations can be brought 
together to advance emissions-mitigation aspirations. German companies are interested in 
being a part of the EV market and innovation system in China through the introduction of 
German technical standards, gaining familiarity with component recycling vendors and 
other local suppliers, while also wanting to keep environmental sustainability and minimal 
emissions output as a conscious aim of the image of their company. The BMUB and its 
main implementing agency in China, the GIZ, stand for promoting the global goods 
perspective of limiting emissions and improving the local environment through 
environmental life-cycle assessments and the recycling of components, amongst others. 
Chinese companies and agencies are looking to Germany for technological learning based 
on effectiveness and profit criteria, while also supporting China’s ambition to become a 
market and a manufacturing hub for sustainable low-carbon technologies relating to EVs.  
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The designs of the cooperation initiatives also show that there are no strict German and 
Chinese positions. There are stakeholders on both sides that are interested in global good 
gains, as well as competitive advantages. The conflict between these two perspectives thus 
exists in both countries and not necessarily between the two nations; however, this makes 
international technology cooperation between the two countries quite complex. For 
example, the BMUB is engaged with a view to leveraging emissions reduction through EVs 
in China. The BMBF too is looking to engage with EVs in China using renewable energy 
for charging. Our results find that the space for international cooperation between Germany 
and China in electromobility has been designed to include most aspects of the innovation 
cycle of electric vehicles as a prioritised sector of low-carbon development, ranging from 
basic research to testing and demonstration, as well as energy charging systems. However, 
until now, initiatives being implemented remain limited to firm-level ventures and mostly 
policy-informing activities. While this reflects the strategic nature of electromobility in 
particular, and international technology cooperation in general, climate change concerns 
require technologies to be developed assiduously, rather than delayed as is currently the 
case. This delay in implementing and executing the larger technological cooperation 
initiatives that would benefit EV as a technology lies particularly at odds with Germany’s 
and China’s positions within the international climate regime: Germany’s projects itself as 
being a climate change mitigation leader globally, and China had claimed to be serious 
about tackling its already large emissions base through low-carbon technologies, without 
which its emissions are likely to grow manifold in the coming decades. 
Given these limitations in bilateral cooperation, attention will now turn to multilateral 
initiatives (Section 4) before policy conclusions are drawn in Section 5 in connection with 
the leveraging of innovation systems and deployment strategies of electric vehicles through 
both channels: bi- and multilateral. 
4 International technology cooperation: multilateral electromobility 
initiatives 
Given the strategic value accorded to EVs and the limited scope of bilateral cooperation – 
even between two countries that are both strong protagonists in the climate regime – what 
are the prospects of multilateral initiatives?  
The EU in its high-level meeting with China on energy announced enhanced cooperation in 
the automotive sector, “aiming at the promotion of the common objectives of reduction of 
energy consumption and emissions, notably via development of electromobility” (EU 2012, 
2). At the same meeting, it was agreed to strengthen science and technology cooperation 
between the two regions, in particular to promote the effective development and deployment 
of innovative solutions to major societal challenges of common interest. Such language is 
well suited to the case of electric vehicles and the ongoing private-sector cooperation in the 
electromobility sector between Europe and China. Although the European Commission has 
established several MoUs and working committees with China, particularly garnered 
towards low-carbon sustainable development24, there has been no tangible cooperation or 
progress on technological cooperation between China and the EU on EVs so far. It is not 
                                                            
24 See Annex 1. 
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surprising that a concerted push for electric vehicles as such is still missing at the level of 
the European Union in its external engagement with other countries since the EU has steered 
clear of taking a unified stand on electromobility standards and norms so far even within its 
member-base, stemming from the fact that several member states are still trying to create a 
niche and break into this nascent sector, and are competitors amongst themselves.  
However, for the global goods perspective to gain traction through technological 
cooperation, a norm within the climate regime and outside of it must support it. In this 
section, multilateral cooperation relevant to EV technology development will be described. 
The focus is on the UNFCCC as a pillar for facilitating climate mitigation action; as well as 
the International Energy Agency’s Electric Vehicle Initiative (IEA EVi). The intention is to 
take stock of the actors and impacts that these international channels of cooperation are 
having, and can have, on EVs technology development. 
4.1 The International Energy Agency’s Electric Vehicle Initiative (IEA EVi) 
This is the only initiative dedicated to the electromobility sector at a multilateral level. It 
seeks to bring data on electromobility into the public domain, and create a facilitating 
environment for bilateral partnerships to be set up. Established in 2011, it has a membership 
base of fifteen countries across the globe and is open to participation from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA). It also has participation from automakers, think-tanks, as well as 
city-level government agencies. Primarily a knowledge-sharing network, it published an 
“EV Cities Case Book” in 2012 that profiles case-studies of the electromobility initiatives of 
16 cities. Through this publication and its online portal, the EVi seeks to showcase best-
practice examples for urban electromobility (IEA 2012), relevant R&D designs for public 
deployment programmes, as well as to bring the public and private sector to engage in 
designing respective roles to create and invest in a holistic EV ecosystem, as has been 
confirmed by interview correspondence of IEA representatives.25 It does not fund actual 
research or city partnerships; rather brings together practitioners who are all focussed on 
building EVs as a mobility solution and product; and is particularly geared to highlighting 
the relevance of policy frameworks required for successful development and deployment of 
this technology. This initiative includes both China and Germany as participants, and 
through the network linkages the EVi provides, Volkswagen has announced that it would be 
undertaking demonstration activities in a special “China Demonstration Zone” to be set up 
by the government there. Studying these private-sector initiatives facilitated through the 
network that the EVi provides, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
4.2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The UNFCCC lies at the heart of the global climate change regime. It “remains the one 
platform where global ambition and equity can be discussed and potentially agreed upon” 
(Moncel / Levin 2012). Over the past years, the UNFCCC has not been able to negotiate 
sufficient emission-mitigation commitments from countries. However, it has made 
remarkable strides in creating funding mechanisms. More than USD 35 billion has been 
pledged by different countries as climate change adaptation and mitigation funds (Heinrich 
                                                            
25 For more information, please see http://www.worldevcities.org/. 
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Boll Stiftung / ODI 2013). In the space of technology cooperation, the progress has been 
slower, owing in no small degree to the trade-offs discussed earlier. Technology 
cooperation, facilitated by the UNFCCC between member countries, is negligible in the case 
of electromobility. Although transportation is a sector that is clearly mentioned as being an 
integral recipient of such technological and financial transfers, there is little or no mention of 
UNFCCC-facilitated cooperation on electromobility. Surprisingly, there is also no 
information available on electric vehicles or electromobility under the UNFCCC technology 
database (UNFCCC 2012a). The following are the most relevant corridors, institutions and 
mechanisms through which cooperation and negotiation on technology takes place within 
the UNFCCC.  
Articles in the UNFCCC: The Convention stipulates that all Parties are to promote and 
cooperate in developing, applying and diffusing – including transferring – technologies, 
practices and processes that reduce or prevent GHG emissions (Article 4.1 (c)). According 
to Article 4.3, Annex I countries are to provide financial resources for the transfer of 
technology. Article 4.5 urges Annex I Parties and Annex II parties to take all practicable 
steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly to 
developing countries, to enable them to implement the provisions of the convention. The 
extent to which developing country parties will effectively implement their commitments 
under the convention will depend on the effective implementation by Annex I country 
Parties with regards to financial resources and transfer of technology (Article 4.7).  
Clean Development Mechanism: A flexibility mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol26, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), allows an Annex I country to implement an 
emission-reduction project in developing countries with the aim of earning saleable carbon-
reduction credits to meet their own emission reduction targets set under the Kyoto Protocol. 
In 2011, the methodology and criteria for using electromobility as a technology to reduce 
emissions and gain carbon credits was presented for small-scale projects under the CDM 
(CDM 2011). Currently, China is not a part of any such CDM programme; it does have the 
largest number of running CDM projects in the world though.27  
Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer: The GEF (Global Environment 
Facility) Council and the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) / Special Climate Change 
Fund (SCCF) Council approved the Strategic Program on Technology Transfer in 
November 2008, to scale up investments for transfer of environmentally-safe technologies. 
This entails three funding opportunities for developing countries: one, technology needs 
assessment; two, conducting pilot projects on priorities identified through the Technical 
Needs Assessment; and three, disseminating experiences and successfully demonstrated 
environmentally-safe technologies (UNFCCC 2011). China is partaking of the UN Poznan 
Strategic fund for technology in the following two ways: firstly, a Technical Needs 
Assessment is being undertaken for China which would entail a detailed analysis of its low-
carbon technology requirements; and secondly, having been accepted as a pilot project, a 
green transport project began in November 2011 in China’s Guangdong province. 
                                                            
26 Article 12 of the Protocol 
27 However, four projects were registered in India (with Switzerland as a partner) for avoiding emissions 
through sale and use of 2-wheeler ebikes towards late 2012. (For more information, see 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html.) 
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However, this project makes no mention of electric vehicles, rather green energy efficient 
technologies for trucks28 (UNFCCC 2011).  
Technology Mechanism: Established through the Cancun Agreements as an outcome of the 
Conference of Parties held there in 2010, the Technology Mechanism is expected to 
facilitate cooperation on technology development and transfer in order to support mitigation 
and adaptation activities through (a) a Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and (b) a 
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) (UNFCCC 2010). The TEC met for the 
first time in 2011, and a UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme)-led consortium 
was made host of the Climate Technology Centre in late 2012. The functions of the 
Technology Mechanism can be summarised as follows:29 (a) Providing an overview of 
technological needs along with an analysis of technical issues relevant for the development 
and transfer of technology in climate change mitigation and adaptation; (b) Assisting in the 
creation of international, regional and national technology action plans to promote 
cooperation in technology, and (c) Promoting the collaboration on the development and 
transfer of technology related to mitigation and adaptation between governments, private-
sector actors, non-profit organisations and research and academic communities. 
The functions of the CTCN are complementary to those of the TEC, listed above. The core 
functions include: (a) Identifying technology needs for the implementation of 
environmentally sound technologies, practices and processes in developing countries and 
facilitating the prompt deployment of existing technologies; (b) Promoting their ability to 
maintain, operate and adapt technology; (c) Promoting R&D cooperation including through 
South-South and trilateral channels; (d) Facilitating international partnerships among public 
and private stakeholders to accelerate the innovation and diffusion of environmentally sound 
technologies to developing country parties. 
In essence, the Technology Mechanism comprises the Technology Executive Committee 
which is intended to function as the policy arm, and the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network (CTCN), which is meant to promote and create partnerships that foster technology 
development and deployment. However, both these new institutions are still facing several 
open questions, ranging from financing to defining the roles and priorities that would 
enhance technology development and cooperation.  
In the UNFCCC negotiations, developed Annex I countries, including Germany, have 
voiced the need for appropriate enabling environments in less-developed countries, 
conducive for foreign investments. Emerging and less-developed economies have been 
negotiating for push factors from developed countries such as increasing financial and 
technical support to enhance indigenous technical capacities, increasing private-sector 
participation and government-level transfers to create further leverage. By bringing together 
a concerted representative group of Annex I and non-Annex I countries, the balanced 
governance structure of the TEC holds promise of a true partnership in agenda-setting and 
capacity-building, rather than looking at developing countries as being just recipients of 
technology transfers. However, for this to materialise, it is important that the Technology 
Mechanism takes up certain concrete measures that lie at the core of technology 
cooperation. This is addressed in more detail in the next section with the aim of highlighting 
                                                            
28 For more information, see http://cleanairinitiative.org/portal/sites/default/files/Project_Summary_38_-
_Guangdong_GF_Project.pdf.  
29 For details, see UNFCCC 2010, paragraph 121 of Decision 1/CP 16. 
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current gaps and of offering recommendations that may help accelerate international 
technology cooperation. 
The UNFCCC financing mechanisms also include Joint Initiatives, the Green Climate Fund 
as well as the Adaptation Fund.30 While the UNFCCC and other financing mechanisms that 
lie outside its ambit (such as the GEF31) are undertaking a great deal of cooperative work 
with China, electromobility and electric vehicles find no mention in any of these 
undertakings or planned proposals.  
The above indicates that there is little real cooperation taking place between China and 
international partners on EVs through multilateral frameworks. The global goods argument 
is challenged by national competitive concerns. It is important to note here that trade-offs 
between the two are multiplied at the multilateral level as it brings to the fore the 
competitive concerns amongst and between early industrialisers as well as developed 
countries (as the European Union case shows). The attempt is made to address this in the 
next section by outlining some key policy suggestions that may be adopted to benefit 
deployment and development of electromobility in particular, and other low-carbon 
technologies in general.  
5 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The above discussions have outlined the scope of technology cooperation as extending 
much beyond simple transfers of products and associated maintenance knowledge. 
Innovation in emerging low-carbon technologies such as electromobility requires simulta-
neous and consistent endeavours, from market demonstration, to end-user approaches, as 
well as research and product development. While the multilateral and bilateral cooperation 
initiatives that have been highlighted above acknowledge this larger approach towards 
innovation, the reality on the ground does not reflect this as much. The previous sections 
have described the low level of technology cooperation that is underway in the 
electromobility sector in China at a bilateral level with Germany along with multilateral 
efforts in general. While this can point to the strategic and as-yet unfolding nature of 
electromobility, given the relevance of electromobility for curbing GHG emissions, this 
section offers recommendations that may be applied in order to aide the development of 
innovation systems for electric vehicles and other nascent low-carbon technologies in the 
future as well. These are presented in two subsections, dealing with the bilateral and the 
multilateral levels of international technology cooperation, respectively. 
5.1 Bilateral cooperation 
As noted in Section 3, although high-level announcements of bilateral cooperation 
between Germany and China on electromobility have been made with a view to 
strengthening the innovation systems of EVs in both countries, practical cooperation is 
fairly limited. It relates mostly to regulatory frameworks and policy-informing research 
                                                            
30 For more information, see: http://unfccc.int/focus/finance/items/7001.php. 
31 For example, GEF is also funding a China Renewable Energy Scale Up Programme, and Green Energy 
schemes for low carbon Shanghai, outside the funding scope of the Poznan Strategy. 
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initiatives, which – although important – are only one aspect influencing the technology 
cycle. Thus, a major recommendation would be to actually implement the bilateral 
programmes that have been announced as these have correctly identified several areas of 
cooperation that would constitute a win-win for both countries. These include product 
testing, market behaviour studies, basic technical research, and capacity-building, amongst 
others. One of the factors stalling implementation of these initiatives is the lack of an 
enabling environment in China. Chinese national policies do not encourage foreign 
collaboration in this sector, in particular owing to the rather coercive policies of forming 
joint ventures and mandatory technology transfer. This has undermined trust in Germany 
regarding respect for intellectual property rights, although German participation has been 
lively in public-alliances where direct benefit can be accrued to their strategic goals, such 
as in standardisation committees.  
Given the large emissions reduction and sustainable development potential of low-carbon 
technologies, China must – as a first – address this trust deficit and attempt to create an 
enabling environment for cooperation through bilateral and multilateral platforms. Instruments 
for China to do so lie beyond the scope of this paper; however, we do suggest the following to 
increase cooperation in the field of low-carbon technologies: 
1. Develop innovation plans32 for the technology bilaterally, aligning these with areas 
of strong capabilities in each country. As noted in Section 2, both countries have 
strengths and weaknesses in different parts of the innovation system for electric vehicles. 
Undertaking a systematic review of these in comparison for both the countries would 
benefit industrial development of low-carbon technologies by highlighting space for win-
win industrial and technical cooperation efforts across national borders. This would allow 
the identification of technology areas in pre-commercial stages that could be jointly built 
up and help create linkages with local supplier groups across countries. The long-term 
development potential of less-developed countries could also be enhanced with such an 
effort as it would pinpoint areas for building innovation capabilities for these technologies. 
Capacity-building could then be taken up as an area of added concern and impetus by 
various different bilateral partners.  
2. Develop technological innovation systems relative to an emissions baseline in 
China.33 Electromobility could play a critical role in avoiding emissions from China’s 
transportation sector. Linking China’s policy goals for the rollout of EVs more explicitly 
to emissions reduction targets could enable greater international support from bilateral 
partners as well as through multilateral frameworks. A next step for bilateral Sino-German 
cooperation could be to set up a joint working group that develops a technological 
roadmap for China driven by an environmental logic and emissions outcome.  
3. Link ongoing city-level pilot and showcase projects of both countries through the 
creation of a research programme with ownership by both governments. This would 
undertake a comparative study of the impacts of these projects in each country, and extract 
lessons from consumer behaviour and market development. This would be similar to the 
                                                            
32 This is one of the recommendations submitted by De Coninck and Byrne 2013 for national-level policy 
interventions for low-carbon technologies. 
33 This is one of the recommendations submitted by De Coninck and Byrne 2013 for national-level policy 
interventions for low-carbon technologies. 
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German concept of Begleitforschung (accompanying research), which is conducted in 
close collaboration with implementing agencies to monitor different impacts and the 
uptake behaviour of technologies and to assess policy effectiveness, and which puts results 
into the public access. This exercise is being undertaken in Germany, to compare the 
different Schaufenster (or showcase) programmes of electromobility that are being 
conducted in various different cities.34 Since there are similar city-level programmes being 
conducted in China, having a scientific, centrally-funded research programme compare the 
two countries’ city-level programmes would be helpful in progressing business interests 
and government incentive/infrastructure systems, based on neutral scientific evidence. 
This could also be used to gain traction within the IEA EV Initiative. 
4. Continue negotiating for emissions standards and establish voluntary environmental 
benchmarks for the recycling of component materials and renewable energy use for charging 
electric vehicles. It was voluntary emission standards that were adopted in the EU, Japan and 
then Korea in different sectors that led to these becoming mandatory in the EU. The German 
mandate of using only renewable energy to power electric cars presents a unique emissions-
free mobility option. Negotiating for this to be streamlined into Chinese EV ambitions through 
its technological sub-systems (the grid-interface, for instance), Germany can push for 
environmental benefits to accrue through this technology, in order to avoid a race to the 
bottom.  
5.2 Multilateral cooperation 
Given the lack of international technological cooperation underway at a multilateral level, 
we focus our attention particularly on UNFCCC. As the central institution regulating the 
global regime on climate change, its relevance as a facilitator and global norm-setter could 
be critical. A summary of the available cooperation mechanisms that seek to encourage 
technological cooperation which can be applied to the case of electromobility were 
presented in Section 4. These are the specific clauses enshrined in UNFCCC that 
encourage developed or Annex I countries to undertake and financially facilitate 
technology transfer and development in developing countries so that the latter may adopt 
and adapt to low-carbon technologies in all possible sectors. However, there is no norm or 
mandate that facilitates a definite technological cooperation between nations as discussed 
earlier in this study, that is, one which encourages technological cooperation as a means 
of building up of innovation systems for low-carbon technologies. As the emerging 
technology mechanism unfolds, certain opportunities and suggestions that may do so in a 
more concerted manner could be proposed:  
1. Engage with the business community. As noted in the bilateral initiative established 
between Germany and China, the lack of private-sector support is impeding its successful 
development and deployment. The cases where there has been progress within the bilateral 
initiatives have all been backed by support from industry, or have enjoyed direct 
participation from private-sector firms as broader alliances. Moreover, globally over two-
thirds of low-carbon investments and technology stem from the private sector of 
                                                            
34 For more information, see http://www.bine.info/en/topics/energy-systems/electric-mobility/news/ 
elektromobiles-siegertreppchen/. 
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developed Annex I countries.35 Thus, if the Technology Mechanism is to succeed in 
bringing technology cooperation to the fore in the development and climate change 
agenda globally, the private-sector needs to be made a part of the Technology Mechanism 
from the onset. So far, however, it has negligible buy-in from the private sector. While the 
advisory board of the CTCN has one business NGO (non-governmental organisation) as a 
non-voting member and several business NGO observers and contributors, their role needs 
to be defined. Interviewees from these business NGOs and industrial associations stated 
that there was no clarity on how they could move forward in helping to operationalise the 
Technology Mechanism. We suggest the Technology Mechanism could engage with the 
private sector in the following ways: 
• Create public-private alliances for the development of specific technologies across the 
developed and developing country divide geared towards testing and R&D. In addition, 
to support dissemination and enable technology adaptation to the local environment, the 
Technology Mechanism should seek to foster linkages with local supplier networks. The 
private sector has shown interest in such an alliance approach as it lowers technological 
uncertainties in developing countries and assures international property rights protection 
due to the presence of multilateral and government agencies in such cooperation 
initiatives. Moreover, it helps generate market familiarity in new technological sectors in 
less-developed economies.  
• Create space for individual companies/Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to come on 
board the CTCN. The Technology Mechanism would benefit from the private sector 
more directly by bringing on board certain firms who already have extensive experience 
in undertaking technology development in non-Annex I countries, as members to the 
CTC network for example. This could be a platform to share best practices and suggest 
innovative ways of creating enabling environments for technology development in non-
Annex I nations, as well as to prominently publicise the socially-responsible work that 
these companies have led. The CTCN, in its mandate, is open to private-sector 
organisations as members. However, no systematic steps to inform or include firms have 
been taken so far. 
• Play an integrating role with regard to standards and norms, establishing the 
environmental benefits of these technologies as a benchmark. Standardisation is a key 
area of concern for the private sector in upcoming low-carbon technologies. As 
discussed in Section 3, this is particularly due to uncertainty related to these 
technologies and competing global manufacturing and distribution networks. In the 
absence of undefined standards, having a voluntary benchmark would enable an open 
market approach to trade and commerce, as different countries may adopt these into 
laws and regulations. Although the Technology Mechanism would not take on the role 
of a standardisation and certification authority, it could transparently highlight the best 
environmental norm or standard from an emissions-mitigation perspective.  
• Encourage enabling environments in developing countries to attract foreign technical 
and financial engagement. The most common hurdle cited by Annex I firms and 
countries against engaging in technology cooperation is the lack of an enabling 
environment in developing countries. This includes the regulatory framework that 
                                                            
35 Policy guidance for investment in clean energy infrastructure, OECD 2013 
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encourages foreign investments and collaborations, as well as the local capacities to 
adapt and adopt new technologies. It is well accepted that policy coordination amongst 
different agencies and authorities within a country can positively impact the enabling 
environment for new technologies. Thus, the Technology Mechanism should help build 
capacity within developing countries to bridge between various ministries within a non-
Annex I country looking to build a particular low-carbon industry. By doing so, a 
balance can be struck between the performance requirements imposed on international 
firms (for example, local content, local ownership, etc.) and policies that attract business 
investments (such as feed-in-tariffs, tax breaks, etc.). This would lower the bureaucratic 
hurdles that international firms face in developing countries; as well as help guide 
domestic agencies to identify gaps in the domestic capacities required to successfully 
adopt and adapt to these new technologies.  
2. Harmonise international property rights regimes and low-carbon technology 
development. Interviews for the case study drew out concerns from both China and 
Germany with regard to IPR. As discussed earlier, German interviewees remarked on trust 
deficit with regards to knowledge/property rights not being respected; Chinese interviewees 
claimed complexity and inaccessibility of IPR as hampering technology cooperation. 
Although not included in the mandate of the Technology Mechanism, the issue of 
international property rights has been raised by non-Annex I parties consistently within and 
outside the UNFCCC framework as a hurdle to low-carbon development. Some options for 
the Technology Mechanism to address these concerns, and encourage technology 
development, diffusion and cooperation are:  
• The Technology Mechanism could help promote and utilise a number of patented 
technologies that are officially made available through patent pools, open access, patent 
information databases, etc. The Technology Mechanism could bridge the gap between 
developing countries and these licensing mechanisms by building capacity within 
national agencies. Such efforts should be geared towards understanding the legal 
nuances of using these pools, negotiating for access to patented technologies, technology 
management and familiarising scientists and lawyers in developing countries with patent 
drafting; in addition they should identify projects that can utilise these open-access 
technologies.  
• The Technology Mechanism could attempt to apportion funds towards IPR sales and 
usage rights from the global pool of 100 billion dollars per year, agreed to be pledged 
towards climate mitigation by Annex I countries after 2020. The CTCN could create 
larger technology projects using these technology patent sales to help develop the 
technological sector, and associated capacity and employment in non-Annex I parties.  
• Using its CTCN, the Technology Mechanism could facilitate the setting up of a 
multilateral research network, akin to CGIAR Research Programmes and Funds 
(established as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research). These 
would work towards strategic outcomes that are accessible and available for public use, 
and involve R&D of low-carbon technologies cutting across national borders based on 
global public goods concerns relating to climate change. This would also enable a shift 
away from the dominant research institutes of Annex I countries by globally 
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encouraging scientific innovations and boosting the innovation capacities of developing 
countries.36  
Based on the above recommendations and our findings, this paper concludes with the 
understanding that, while examining the commercial viability of new low-carbon 
technologies is critical for it to develop within a particular country, it is also important to 
understand and standardise its environmental benefits globally. Thus, in order to stimulate 
international technology cooperation to accelerate the pace of low-carbon transitions 
globally, further research should focus on the various different technological scenarios and 
their environmental benefits for countries adopting these technologies. This would garner 
support from a different set of lobbyists, namely various environmental and civil society 
groups at the domestic and international level. Combined with the push from companies 
seeking to profit through these technologies, this would benefit a quicker and more holistic 
transition to these technologies. 
                                                            
36 For more information, see http://www.cgiar.org. 
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Annex 1: EU-level cooperation 
The most relevant channels for cooperating on electromobility with China: 
European Investment Bank (EIB): The EU Green Cars Initiative37 provides loans through the European 
Investment Bank. A total of EUR 1 billion has been earmarked for R&D through the joint funding 
programmes of the European Commission, the industry and the member states. It includes an industrial 
advisory group and has 50 projects in its ambit. No cooperation with non-EU nations seems to be planned. 
However, outside the ambit of the Green Cars Initiative, the EIB granted China EUR 500 million in loan 
under the Climate Change Framework Loan II (CCFL II; a similar framework loan was granted to China 
in 2007 as well) to help achieve targets set by the Chinese government in its 11th and 12th Five Year 
Plans, through different climate mitigation projects (maximum 15) in different parts of the country that 
promote renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
FP7: The EU’s 7th Framework Programme (FP7) ran from 2007 until the end of 2013. It bundled all 
research-related EU initiatives together under a common roof, playing a crucial role in reaching the goals 
for growth, competitiveness and employment. It has a budget of EUR 32.413 billion, and China is the 
third largest partner behind the United States and Russia with approximately 220 Chinese research 
institutions and businesses being involved as of the 7th FP. Amongst the ten thematic areas that come 
under the Cooperation Objective of the FP7 are energy, transport and the environment.  
In particular, electromobility development and deployment is being garnered through the following high-
level bilateral cooperation channels established between EU and China: the EU-China Summit 2012 
saw the launch of a China-EU Partnership on Sustainable Urban Development, and reinforced the 
EU-China High-Level Energy Meetings to enhance cooperation in the automotive sector, aiming at the 
promotion of the common objectives of reduction of energy consumption and emissions, notably via 
development of electromobility. At the same summit, it was agreed that cooperation should be 
strengthened in the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement between the two regions, in 
particular to promote the effective development and deployment of technology innovative solutions to 
major societal challenges of common interest. Such language is well suited to the case of electric vehicles 
and the ongoing private-sector cooperation in the electromobility sector between Europe and China.  
The EU and China also have a flagship initiative called the Europe China Clean Energy Centre (EC2) 
in Beijing, and an International Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy in Wuhan. These are the 
main channels, as per the EU factsheet on cooperation with China, for cooperation towards energy and 
sustainable development. Besides the above, the EU has several cooperative arrangements with China at a 
diplomatic level. These include the EU-China Climate Change Partnership, the High-Level Economic 
and Trade Dialogue, and the Strategic Dialogue, amongst others.  
 
  
                                                            
37 Supported by CAPIRE (Coordination Action within the framework of the European Green Cars 
Initiative) and ICT4FEV initiates, also no developing country partnerships through these; more 
information available at http://www.green-cars-initiative.eu/.  
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Annex 2: Interview list  
Organisational position of interviewee Number of persons interviewed 
Multilateral level  
UNFCCC and Technology Mechanism representatives 19 
Development banks 3 
International development agencies 11 
National level  
Federal ministries 5 
Implementing agencies 9 
Think-tanks 10 
Industry association 5 
Other  
University professors/researchers 18 
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